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Zotob
Alert
infectionvectors.com
Updated: August 2005
Vector:
Plug & Play Vulnerability in W2K Machines
(Variant C attacks
via ASN.1 exploit and mass mail)
Impact:
High (system stability, complete control of victim system)
This
worm attacks machines via the vulnerability described in MS05-039, the
Plug and Play flaw released in August of 2005. The distribution of the
worm occurred less than one week from the advisory.
Once
resident on a system, the malware creates entries pointing to
“botzor.exe” in the Registry to ensure that is starts up with the
operating system. The name “BOTZOR” is also used as a mutex. Much
like its cousins, the Mytob family, Zotob connects to an IRC control
channel to allow backdoor access to the infected machine. In addition,
the worm opens TCP 33333 for an FTP server, which servers the code to
the next victim (much like Sasser).
Zotob
spreads by randomly connecting to clients sharing the same first two
octets as the infected system. It does this by attempting to open a
connection to TCP 445. Where connections are made, the worm delivers the
exploit code. If the system happens to be an unpatched Windows 2000
machine, the attack is likely to be successful – resulting in the
target opening an FTP session on TCP 8888 and downloading the worm from
the attacking machine (and, of course, executing the malware).
In
addition to malicious HOSTS entries, establishing auto-startup, and
launching a new attack of its own, the worm connects to:
diabl0.turkcoders.net:8080
In
order to receive commands from its controller.
The
worm also has the following string:
Botsor2005
Made By.... Greetz to good friend Coder. Based on HellBot3 MSG to avs:
the first av to detect this worm will be the first killed in the next
24hrs!!!
Update:
Zotob.B
This
iteration uses the Registry entry “csm” for auto-start capabilities,
otherwise this version looks like the initial release.
Update:
Zotob.C
Adds
the following string to the local HOSTS file:
Botzor2
pnp+asn+mail spread. Greetz to good friend Coder. Based on HellBot3.
f-secure, sophos ok wait bitches!!!
The
worm carries an email propagation routine, making it nearly identical in
form to Mytob. Moreover, the authors also added the ASN.1 exploit
(MS04-007) from 2004 as a propagation mechanism. This version uses
“PER.EXE” in the Registry to ensure auto start-up.
Update:
Zotob.D
D
adds four new IRC servers to the mix and some quality control: the worm
checks for Internet connectivity by reaching out to Google, Yahoo, and
EBay. Furthermore, if the infected machine’s IP address is one found
in RFC 1918 (reserved space) the worm does not attempt to connect to any
of the IRC servers. This version interestingly extends the number of
adware/spyware-related applications it attempts to kill/delete. The kill
list also includes former versions of itself.
Beginning
with the fourth revision of the worm, many AV sites have begun
classifying samples of this MS05-039 worm under different names. At this
time, samples available to infectionvectors.com do not appear to require
new names; as is seen below.
Update:
Zotob.E
This
version switches from FTP to TFTP (a la Blaster) to move the worm code
from victim to victim. Instead of a hostname, Zotob.E comes with a
hard-coded IP address to use as the IRC server (72.20.27.115, and a
channel named #tbp).
Update:
Zotob.F
The
IRC server changes from the one used in E to 72.20.41.139. The kill list
for this iteration also includes former versions of Zotob.
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